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Introduction Special Issue JEDC Crises and Complexity 
 
Cars Hommes and Giulia Iori 
 
The financial-economic crisis has changed the way of thinking of economist and policy 
makers. In an often quoted opening address to the ECB Central Banking Conference, 
November 2010, then president of the ECB Jean-Claude Trichet said: ``.. in the face of the 
crisis, we felt abandoned by conventional tools’’. Trichet advocated an interdisciplinary 
approach to apply complex systems and to develop agent-based models (ABMs) to model 
financial-economic crises and use these models for policy1:   
 
``The atomistic, optimising agents underlying existing models do not capture behaviour 
during a crisis period. We need to deal better with heterogeneity across agents and the 
interaction among those heterogeneous agents. We need to entertain alternative motivations 
for economic choices. Behavioural economics draws on psychology to explain decisions 
made in crisis circumstances. Agent-based modelling dispenses with the optimisation 
assumption and allows for more complex interactions between agents. Such approaches are 
worthy of our attention. …  
In this context, I would very much welcome inspiration from other disciplines: physics, 
engineering, psychology, biology. Bringing experts from these fields together with economists 
and central bankers is potentially very creative and valuable. Scientists have developed 
sophisticated tools for analysing complex dynamic systems in a rigorous way. These models 
have proved helpful in understanding many important but complex phenomena: epidemics, 
weather patterns, crowd psychology, magnetic fields. Such tools have been applied by 
market practitioners to portfolio management decisions, on occasion with some success. I 
am hopeful that central banks can also benefit from these insights in developing tools to 
analyse financial markets and monetary policy transmission’’.  
In November 2011 an EU interdisciplinary collaborative project Complexity Research 
Initiative for Systemic InstabilitieS (CRISIS) started taking up Trichet’s challenge to develop a 
complexity interactions agent-based model for the European financial-economic crisis. A 
particular challenge of the project is to integrate macroeconomic and financial agent-based 
models as a more realistic description of the financial-economic crisis2. This special issue on 
Crises and Complexity reflects some of the ongoing work of this interdisciplinary 
collaboration between economists, physicists, computer scientists, etc. that has been 
presented and discussed at various CRISIS workshops in Milan, London, Paris and Leiden 
throughout 2012-2014.  
The special issue consists of 9 papers, the first 3 more focused on macroeconomic ABMs 
and the last 6 more on financial ABMs and financial networks.  
The first contribution, by Tiziana Assenza, Domenico Delli Gatti and Jakob Grazzini studies 
the emergent dynamics of a Macroeconomic Agent-Based Model with Capital and Credit 
(CC-MABM), building upon the framework put forward by Delli-Gatti et al. 2011. A key feature 
of ABMs is the ``bottom-up’’ approach using simple and ``realistic’’ individual decision rules 
                                         
1 Recent discussions and up to date surveys of complexity economics are Kirman (2011) and Hommes (2013), 
while Bouchaud discusses applications of statistical physics models to socio-economic phenomena. LeBaron 
(2006) and Iori and Porter (2014) survey financial ABMs and Delli Gatti macro ABMs, while Tesfatsion and 
Judd (2006) include many more contributions and surveys on ABMs. Farmer and Foley (2009) stress the 
importance of ABMs for economics and Farmer et al. (2012) stress the role of ABMs for policy.     
2 A number of other ABMs have been developed for policy analysis, see the recent discussions and overviews 
in Dosi et al. (2013) and Dawid et al. (2014).  
(heuristics) for consumer and firm behavior. An ABM is the aggregation of all individual 
decision rules. The main novelty of this model with respect to the earlier work is the 
introduction of a stylized supply chain where upstream firms --i.e. producers of capital goods 
(K-firms)-- supply a durable and sticky input (capital) to the downstream firms, who produce 
consumption goods (C-firms) to be sold to households. Both C-firms and K-firms resort to 
bank loans to satisfy their financing needs. The two-ways feedbacks between firms and 
markets yield interesting emerging properties at the macro level. The paper shows that the 
interaction of upstream and downstream firms and the evolution of their financial conditions --
in a nutshell: Capital and Credit -- are essential ingredients of a crisis, i.e. a sizable slump 
followed by a long recovery. 
 
An ABM with many agents is sometimes said to be a black box in which it may be difficult to 
distinguish cause and effect. The second contribution, by Stanislao Gualdi, Marco Tarzia, 
Francesco Zamponi and Jean-Philippe Bouchaud, use simple stylized complexity models to 
explore the possible types of phenomena that macroeconomic Agent-Based models (ABM) 
can reproduce. Their methodology is inspired by statistical physics, that characterizes a 
model through its phase diagram in the parameter space in order to detect the tipping points 
that cause critical transitions, i.e. sudden changes, in macroeconomic ABMs. Their starting 
point is to understand the large macro-economic fluctuations observed in the ``Mark I" ABM 
of Delli Gatti and collaborators. Their major finding is the generic existence of a phase 
transition between a ``good economy" where unemployment is low, and a ``bad economy" 
where unemployment is high in a simple stylized framework. This transition is generically 
induced by an asymmetry between the rate of hiring and the rate of firing of the firms. The 
unemployment level remains small until a tipping point, beyond which the economy suddenly 
collapses. If the parameters are such that the system is close to this transition, any small 
fluctuation is amplified as the system jumps between the two equilibria. A number of 
extensions of the model are explored, e.g. with bankruptcy threshold, limiting the firms 
maximum level of debt-to-sales ratio. This leads to a rich phase diagram with, in particular, a 
region where acute endogenous crises occur, during which the unemployment rate shoots up 
before the economy can recover. The effect of simple monetary policies that attempt to 
contain rising unemployment and prevent crises are also explored. The paper ends with 
general comments on the usefulness of ABMs to model macroeconomic phenomena and the 
use of simple stylized models in particular.  
 
How to model the many individual decision rules in an ABM? One approach to discipline the 
``wilderness of bounded rationality’’ by empirical guidance is to use laboratory experiments 
with human subjects. A key feature of experimental macroeconomics is the laboratory study 
of group behavior, to investigate simultaneously individual decision rules at the micro level, 
their interactions and the aggregate macro behavior3. In the third paper of this special issue, 
Tiziana Assenza, Jakob Grazzini, Cars Hommes and Domenico Massaro study how firms set 
prices and quantities in a standard  monopolistic competition setting, as e.g. in the macro 
ABMs of Delli-Gatti et al. (2011). The paper present results from 50-rounds experimental 
markets in which firms decide repeatedly both on price and quantity of a perishable good. 
Subjects are asked to make both production and pricing decisions given different information 
sets on individual profits, excess demand and excess supply, and on the aggregate price 
level. Persistent heterogeneity is a characteristic feature of individual behavior, with about 
46% of market followers, 28% profit-adjusters and 26% demand adjusters. Nevertheless, 
prices and quantities tend to converge to the monopolistically competitive equilibrium and we 
find that subjects' behavior is well described by adaptive learning heuristics. 
 
The financial-economic crisis has shown that credit networks and leverage are of crucial 
importance for the spillover of financial instability to macroeconomic dynamics. Credit 
                                         
3 See Duffy (2014) for a collection of recent contributions on the state of the art of Experimental Macro-
economics.  
networks allow risk sharing but also the diffusion and amplification of local shocks into the 
global economy. The contribution by Ermanno Catullo, Mauro Gallegati and Antonio 
Palestrini presents an agent-based macro model with interactions of banks and firms in an 
endogenous credit network. Banks and firms are linked through multiple credit relations and 
agents choose their leverage level according to a reinforcement learning algorithm. 
Simulations are calibrated on balance sheet data of banks and firms quoted in the Japanese 
stock-exchange markets from 1980 to 2012. The paper aims to build an early warning 
indicator based on a network financial accelerator mechanism (Delli Gatti et al., 2010; 
Battiston et al., 2012) in which the amount of leverage is a strategic choice of the economic 
agents. The early warning indicator is based on the analysis of the dynamic configurations of 
the credit network. Simulations show that during expansions network concentration rises and 
the probability of having huge reductions of the output increases. In fact, when some banks 
are in a central position in the credit network - in terms of both number and size of loans - a 
shock (for instance, the failure of a large borrower of the bank) may produce a contraction of 
the loan supply resulting in large systemic effects. The model underlines the importance of 
the dynamics of the credit network for the resilience of the economic system: when the 
aggregate leverage level and the connectivity of the network are relatively high, even small 
local negative shocks may have large systemic effects. Thus, not only agent's size, but also 
their connectivity has a decisive impact on the stability and resilience of the economic 
system, emphasizing the importance of turning policy attention from `too big to fail' to `too 
connected to fail'. 
 
During the crisis, increased uncertainty about counterpart credit risk led banks to hoard  
liquidity rather than making it available in the interbank market. Money markets in most 
developed countries almost came to a freeze and banks were forced to borrow from Central 
Banks. Nonetheless there is growing empirical evidence showing that banks that had 
established long term interbank relationships had better access to liquidity, both in normal 
times and during a crisis. Relationship lending thus, by supporting liquidity reallocation in the 
interbank market, plays a positive role for financial stability. The default, or exit from the 
market, of banks that are important relationship lenders or borrowers may lead to a 
deterioration of the interbank credit market. In this sense, when establishing if a bank is too 
connected to fail, regulators should not only look at how connected a bank is, but also at how 
preferentially connected it is to other key players. Given the potential implications for financial 
stability, it is useful, i.e. for stress test exercises, to develop simple models that, given a set of 
constraints, can generate realistic scenarios, including the formation of stable relationships. 
This is the aim of the paper by Giulia Iori, Rosario Mantegna, Luca Marotta, Salvatore 
Micciche’, James Porter and Michele Tumminello who introduce an agent-based model of 
interbank trading with memory, in a centralized interbank market with heterogeneous market 
participants. The memory mechanism is used to introduce a proxy of trust in the model. The 
memory mechanism assumes that the probability that a lender and a borrower end up 
trading at a given time step depends on their trading frequency (their heterogeneity), on the 
number of times in which the borrower borrowed from the lender in the past, and an overall 
attractiveness of borrowers. Model outcomes and real money market data are compared 
through a variety of measures that describe the structure and properties of trading networks. 
These include number of statistically validated links, bidirectional links, and 3-motifs. The 
model reproduces well features of preferential trading patterns empirically observed in a real 
market.  
 
Two further papers analyze the implication of new regulations proposed under the Basel III 
agreement: the new leverage ratio and the banks resolution mechanisms. The new (Basel III) 
leverage ratio is defined as a minimum percentage (3%) of the capital measure to the 
exposure measure. One of the impacts of this new approach is that it considerably widens 
the definition of what constitutes leverage in the banking system, pushing banks  to either 
increase their capital or reduce their intermediation activity. While advocates of tougher 
regulation generally support this tightening, its critics question if obliging banks to reduce 
their leverage ratio will increase systemic safety more than it reduces the intermediating role 
of the banking system, which in effect is the engine of growth for the real economy.  The aim 
of the paper by, James Porter , Giulia Iori, Giampaolo Gabbi and Saqib Jafarey is to study 
this question. The authors present an agent-based model focusing on the linkage between 
the interbank market and the real economy with a stylised central bank acting as lender of 
last resort. The tradeoff between stability and economic performance is explored for different 
structures of the interbank market. The results of the model provide some support to the 
concerns raised by critics of new Basel framework by showing that on one side low ceilings 
on leverage ratios can protect banks from idiosyncratic and  systemic risk, but they do have 
an anti-competitive effect which hurts borrowers in the real economy, especially in times 
when the demand for bank credit is high. On the other side, relaxed leverage ceilings can 
make banks particularly vulnerable to systemic failure in times when demand for bank credit 
is low. Thus  there appears to be no “one-size-fits-all" solution to financial regulation. 
 
Since the Cypriot Financial crisis in March 2013, which saw the first realization of a bail-in 
resolution mechanism, there has been an intense 'bail-out versus bail-in'  debate to try and 
clarify which mechanism outperforms the other. Proponents of bail-ins often cite the moral 
hazard problem of bail-outs. On the other hand, bail-ins are criticized for providing a channel 
for contagion risks from the failing institution to its investors. Peter Klimek, Sebastian 
Poledna, Doyne Farmer and Stefan Thurner  employ and agent-based model to address the 
question of which of three relevant crisis resolution mechanisms -- bail out, bail in and the 
orderly liquidation of a bank-- performs optimally under given economic circumstances. They 
assess the performance of resolution mechanisms not only in terms of minimizing financial 
contagion risks, but also  in regard to how they impact the entire economy  in term of 
unemployment, economic growth, and liquidity provision to entrepreneurs. An 
implementation of the ``Mark I" ABM of Delli Gatti and collaborators is used and extended by 
the described crisis resolution mechanisms.  A central feature of the Mark I model, as shown 
by Bouchaud and co-authors, is the existence of a first order phase transition between 
economic states of low and high unemployment, which is closely related to the  refinancing 
rate offered to firms. The paper shows that the performance of the resolution mechanisms 
itself depends of which state  the economy is, i.e. whether interest rates are high or low. For 
the low interest regime all three resolution mechanisms perform similar, in the critical interest 
regime bail-outs and bail-ins both outperform the liquiditation case, while in the high interest 
rate regime the bail-in mechanism ranks highest. 
 
The recent financial crisis has highlighted the systemic consequences of the use of leverage. 
If  leveraged investors face a leverage constraint, a negative shock in the assets they hold 
may result in the tightening of their constraint, and force them to sell part of their assets. By 
selling  into falling markets they may cause prices to fall further and leverage to further 
increase. This dynamics is referred to as a leverage cycle. An important driver of leverage 
cycles has been identified in Value-at-Risk risk management strategies. Christoph Aymanns 
and Doyne Farmer contribute to this literature by  developing a dynamic agent-based model 
of leveraged investors that invest in  multiple asset and are subject to a Value-at-Risk 
constraint. The authors use the model to study  the impact of the parameters of risk 
management on the dynamical properties of leverage cycles and how leverage cycles might 
be controlled by regulation policy. In particular they show that bank leverage management 
can cause recurring patterns of stock price bubbles and crashes which occur in a chaotic 
regime of the system. When the leverage regulation policy is sufficiently countercyclical and 
bank risk is sufficiently low the endogenous oscillation disappears and prices go to a fixed 
point.  However, for large values of bank risk counter-cyclical leverage policies still generate 
volatility and instability. The authors show that this behaviour is ultimately due to the 
symmetry of risk to changes in stock price and  suggest a stock return based policy rule, 
rather than volatility based,  on bank riskiness. The effectiveness of this simple rule will 
depend on the time horizon over which the regulator measures the price movements and the 
aggressiveness of his response. Interestingly, this relationship is non-monotonic yielding a 
region of optimal measurement horizon and aggressiveness. The policy is only effective in a 
relatively small region of its parameter space and careful calibration would therefore be 
required for effective implementation. 
 
Apart from the interbank market, any other form of liquidity funding, either with the Central 
Bank or other investors, is collateralized. Repurchase agreements (repo), in which eligible 
assets are exchanged against cash, are one of the most important sources of funding for 
both, commercial and investment, banks. Because of the uncertainty regarding the future 
value of the collateral, the capital lent in a repo is lower than the value of the security at the 
beginning of the contract, by an amount called the haircut. The haircut covers the risk of  
depreciation of the collateral and as such it is related to the volatility of the asset. The 
contribution by Fabrizio Lillo and Davide Pirino addresses how a financier should determine  
the value of the haircut in a repo in order to being protected not just against volatility risk, as 
typically considered in this literature, but also against systemic risk, given the simultaneous 
presence of market illiquidity, target leverage, and portfolio overlap. Asset liquidity is a factor 
because when the financier tries to sell the asset to recover the loss by the potential default 
of a borrower, he may recover less than the mark-to market price, due to price impact 
effects. The potential overlap of the portfolio of the defaulting borrower to that of other funds 
could help spread the distress to other investors if the devaluation of the asset triggers the 
funds’ leverage constraint and induce them to further liquidation of their portfolios. The multi-
asset aspect is critical in the model as the value of the haircut is also determined by the 
characteristics of assets different from the one used as collateral. 
 
Blanchard (2014) recently commented how standard economic models have failed to 
describe the financial-economic crisis as these models did not pay attention to ``the dark 
corners where the economy can malfunction badly’’. Blanchard stresses the role of 
nonlinearities and how small shocks to nonlinear systems can have large effects and lead to 
crises. He notes that standard DSGE models are expanded to better recognize the role of 
the financial system, and raises the question: ``But should these models be able to describe 
how the economy behaves in the dark corners?’’. Is it enough to extend DSGE models with 
financial sectors within an otherwise standard rational expectations and optimization 
framework? Blanchard writes ``Trying to create a model that integrates normal times and 
systemic risks may be beyond the profession’s conceptual and technical reach at this stage”. 
But there is an alternative underway and it seems wise to put substantial efforts into a 
complementary research program on agent-based complexity models with nonlinear 
feedbacks to explore the dark corners of the economy. Much work remains to be done in 
order to develop a generation of macro-financial ABMs ready to assist policy makers in 
managing and preventing extreme events and monitor crises. We hope that this special issue 
reflects some of the exciting challenges and the large potential of the ABM research agenda 
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